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MUSLIM PROSELYTIZATION
AS PURIFICATION




.Uespite the long history of Islam in thé région of West Africa that is the
present-day Republic of Mali, it is only in thé twentieth Century that it has
become thé religion of the majority. This had hardly been the case at the time
of the French conquest and the onset of colonial mie at the close of the nine-
teenth Century. At that time, there were many in the région who were not
Muslims—"animists," "pagans," or "unbelievers" in the different languages
of their detractors. While perhaps the greatest waves of "conversion" by such
people to Islam came during French colonial rule, there have been various
efforts to convert non-Muslims to Islam and to eradicate certain social and reli-
gious practices deemed un-Islamic in the postcolonial period.1 In this essay I
begin by discussing the nature of religieus pluralism in Mali, highlighting some
of the practices that many Muslims find objectionable, and that, therefore, are a
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major source of tension, if not outright conflict, between Islam and Muslims,
on the one hand, and—for lack of a better term—traditional religions and
their practitioners, on the other. I then turn to consider the proselytization
activities of one of Mali's most celebrated, contemporary Muslim religious
leaders, examining the actual mechanisms of his campaigns to spread Islam
among non-Muslims and to extirpate allegedly un-Islamic practices, most no-
tably, spirit possession, as well as some of the intended and unintended consé-
quences of such proselytization efforts. Such attention to religious pluralism
and proselytization activities in this région of West Africa affords a significant
opportunity for reflection on some of the complexity of the ways in which
different social actors construe and reconstrue phenomena as "Islamic" and
"un-Islamic."
RELIGIOUS PLURALISM
Religious pluralism is an important defimng feature of the social landscape of
contemporary Mali. Although estimâtes of the breakdown of Mali's popula-
tion by religion are unreliable, Muslims may comprise between 70 and 90
percent and non-Muslims as much as 30 percent of the country's estimated
nine million inhabitants (cf. Brenner 1993). There is considérable diversity in
the religious discourses and practices of Muslims, as well as non-Muslims in
the country. As far as the plurality of Islamic discourses and practices, there
are basically three différent conceptions of Islam: the Sufi, the anti-Sufi, and a
third, incipient one, which has appeared in the context of an expanded
postcolonial sphère and allows Muslims to identify with thé broader Islamic
Community. Since at least the nineteenth Century, a few Sufi orders (Arabic,
tariqa), particularly the Qadiriyya and the Tijaniyya (including the Hamawiyya,
a branch of the Tijaniyya), have been the main institutional forms for the
practice of Islam in certain parts of the country. Mali has also been the site for
important anti-Sufi activities, most notably by a loose group of self-styled
"Sunnis"—locally known as Wahhabis2 (a term they generally reject) who,
since the 1940s, have sought to bring the practice of Islam in Mali closer to
"correct" practices modeled on the presumed center of the Islamic world, the
Arab Middle East. Most Malian Muslims, however, are neither formally affili-
ated with any of the Sufi orders nor especially enthusiastic about the anti-
Sufis. In Mali, there is increasingly a more generally shared (though hardly
uniform) sense of being Muslim and a commitment to Islam as a religion that
has developed in the postcolonial period, which allows Muslims to imagine
themselves as part of the global Islamic commumty.3
Some of the earliest known Arabic sources about West Africa from the
eleventh Century descnbe all sorts of practices deemed un-Islamic (see
Trimingham 1962). Today, as m the past, certain individuals and groups, who
call themselves Muslims, engage in a range of practices, which many, if not
most, Muslim religious leaders and some laypersons in the country characterize
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unequivocally as un-Islamic. That is, most Malian Muslims, whether Sufi, anti-
Sufi, or not, object to some of thé social and religious practices of others (Mus-
lims and non-Muslims) in the country.4 "Spirit possession" is perhaps the most
widespread (and familiär to outside observers) of these practices. It is prac-
ticed in various forms in villages, towns, and cities throughout Mali, äs in
many other Muslim societies m thé broader région and beyond. Indeed, spirit
possession is so prevalent in so many different Muslim societies that some
scholars (e.g., Boddy 1989; Lewis 1986; Lewis et al. 1991) treat it äs closely
related to other Islamic discourses rather than äs outside the realm of Islam or
äs forms of what is often called "populär" Islam. Without downplaying the
influence of Islam on spirit possession, I want to point to the tensions between
those who déclare spirit possession un-Islamic and those who deny this as well
as the long history of such tensions (see Masquelier 1993a).
Although the history of spirit possession in this part of West Africa is inad-
equately understood, it has had a long présence in this région.5 Over the centu-
ries, in a number of different Arabic texts Muslim scholars in the région have
pointed to the practice of what we might today call spirit possession and
mediumship.6 In the nineteenth Century, prior to the onset of French colonial
rule, some European visitors to the région documented its existence (e.g.,
Raffenel 1856). In the early twentieth Century, French colonial scholar-admin-
istrators collected ethnological and historical materials which suggested that
certain Muslim leaders in the nineteenth-century Futanke state in Karta (in
present-day western Mali) not only tolerated a form of spirit possession but
even patronized those who organized it.7 One of the leaders of the Futanke
state is said to have sought out a renowned spirit medium for the treatment of
an illness. Such patronage of spirit possession by the Muslim leader was, at the
time, so controversial that some of the subjects objected, complaining that the
ruler had become an "unbeliever" (Arabic, kaffir). That is, they effectively
performed takfir (Arabic), declared that he ceased to be a Muslim. This was
perhaps the most serious charge with which to challenge the legitimacy of his
rule, and, as such, may have been a crucial factor in the power struggle that
ensued in Karta prior to the French conquest (cf. Hanson 1996).
Although it is not possible to trace direct links between such reported in-
stances and descriptions of spirit possession from the past and contemporary
religious practices, we can say that today spirit possession is regularly prac-
ticed in a variety of forms throughout Mali (Colleyn 1988; Gibbal 1982,1984,
1994; Malle 1985). In parts of Mali, many of those involved in spirit posses-
sion are organized into what are locally called "spirit societies" (jine-ton m
Bamanakan) and "the dance of spirits" (jine-don in Bamanakan) (Gibbal 1982;
Malle 1985),8 the structure and organization of which are reminiscent of the
Sufi orders (Lewis 1986, 102; Makris 1996). Like the Sufi orders, the spirit
societies have a hierarchical structure m which spint mediums—many of whom
are women—are the leaders or Organizers of the activities of the societies. For
example, meetings and ceremonies are generally held only with the permission
of the head spirit medium(s). The associâtes and followers of the mediums are
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generally in relations of subordination to them; that is, much like the adepts of
Sufi orders are subordinate to Sufi leaders (shaykhs). Some spirit mediums are
known for their considérable wealth and conspicuous consumption. In this
way, they are not unlike some of the leaders of the main Sufi orders in the
région, who are widely known for their ostentation and lavish lifestyles (see
Soares 1996b). In addition, certain spirits in the pantheon are Muslim "saints"
(Arabic, wali)—for example, Ahmad al-Tij ani, the founder of the Tijaniyya—
though not any recent saints from the immédiate région.
It is important to note that people seek out the services of the spirit societies
for many of the same reasons that they seek out practitioners of what can be
called the Islamic esoteric sciences (Brenner 1985; Soares 1997a), that is, for
good health, prosperity, or simply to make sense of the world (cf. Boddy 1994).
In perhaps more cases than in the use of the specifically Islamic esoteric sci-
ences, people seek out spirit societies and mediums for their therapeutic ser-
vices. Indeed, this is how some leading spirit mediums spoke to me about their
clientèle. This may not be unrelated to the fact that even though most of those
involved with spirit possession profess to be Muslims, the spirit societies usu-
ally maintain close ties with non-Muslim healers and diviners (doma in
Bamanakan), for their knowledge oibamanaya? In Bamanakan, Mali's most
widely spoken language and increasingly its main lingua franca, bamanaya
refers to the expert knowledge of the Bamana (or Bambara in French and in
Arabic sources)—read non-Muslim—that includes practices involving blood
sacrifice and the use of religious or power objects, as well as the use of plant-
derived medicines for purposes of divination, protection against misfortune,
and accumulation (cf. Bazin 1985; Soares 1997b; McNaughton 1988).
Many Malian Muslims readily assert that Islam and being Muslim are ir-
reconcilable with spirit possession. Malian Christians (Catholics and Protes-
tants) make similar statements about the incompatibility of Christianity and
spirit possession. There are several kinds of objections that people have to
spirit possession. Interestingly, the close association with non-Muslim healers
is not among them. As in the nineteenth Century case from Karta, many Mus-
lims state that those who participate in spirit possession are effectively unbe-
lievers. From this perspective, even though such people might call themselves
Muslims or even act as such—through regulär prayer, fasting during the month
of Ramadan, and so forth—they are not "really" Muslims. This is because
those who participate in spirit possession treat what they do in communicat-
ing and interacting with spirits (Arabic, jinn) as a religion (Arabic, din). In this
way of thinking, since Islam is the only true religion, it necessarily follows that
all people should give up spirit possession m all its forms.
For many Malian Muslims, one of the spécifie problems with spirit posses-
sion centers around questions of the sacrifice of animais during possession
ceremonies. Specifically, the blood m animal sacrifice is spilled for spirits and
not for God, not unlike the practices associated with non-Muslims in Mali.
For this reason, many Muslim religious leaders and even laypersons in Mali
condemn those involved in spirit possession for "association" or polytheism
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(Arabie, shirk), labeling such people mushrikun, which translates somewhat
loosely from thé Arabie as idolaters. According to reported "Traditions" of
thé Prophet Muhammad, idolatry or polytheism is the greatest of sins (see
Wensinck 1927). It is likely that Malians are drawing consciously or not upon
such "Traditions."
Now I want to focus on some of thé allegedly blâmable practices known or
at least suspected by some Muslims to occur during spirit possession. From
thé perspective of many Muslims, not only the spilling but also the use of the
blood of a sacrificed animal is clearly forbidden. In spirit possession ceremo-
nies, an animal is ritually sacrificed, according to the precepts of Islamic law.
That is, a Muslim man wields the knife and utters "in the name of God."
According to the Islamic légal texts used in this région as well as local practices
and conventions, méat is only licit for consumption if sacrificed in such a
manner (al-Qayrawani 1975,297).10 Since the meat of the sacrificed animal is
prepared for a meal and nearly all those involved in spirit possession consider
themselves Muslims, sacrifice according to Islamic legal precepts is taken for
granted and generally unreflected upon. It is what happens during, or perhaps
more accurately, after the sacrifice that is even more controversial. As the blood
is flowing from the animal, someone, usually a spirit medium's assistant, catches
some of the blood in a container, usually a calabash. Although this blood
might be used in the confection of medicines, some of it may be used immedi-
ately for anointing. On some occasions, individuals might touch the fresh blood
with the index finger of the right hand and put this finger in the mouth.11 In
some cases, this may be prelude to the onset of the dancing that accompanies
possession by a spécifie spirit or spirits. In any case, the consumption of blood
is unambiguously forbidden according to the locally used Islamic legal texts
(al-Qayrawani 1975, 297). Moreover, nearly every Muslim in this context is
able to articulate such a prohibition. The many Muslims who ultimately ac-
cuse those involved in spirit possession of worshiping things other than God
because of such suspected blamable practices are attempting to anathematize
them. As I will discuss below, many involved in spirit possession deny—some-
times quite vehemently—any un-Islamic behavior on their part.
To give some indication of the extent of the enmity toward spirit possession
and its practitioners and the social pressures against them, I offer the follow-
ing examples. Several Malian Muslims told me that if they happened to walk
near a place where spirit possession was going on they would know from the
distinctive and easily recognizable drum beats not to look and to pass by quickly.
They explained that they had been instructed to do this from a very young age.
One man pointed out that every step on the way to a spirit possession cer-
emony was quite literally a step toward heil. A friend, whom I had entreated
to accompany me to spirit possession ceremonies, told me that hè was unable
to do so. This man, who fashions himself a very observant Muslim, worried
that if hè went to a ceremony hè would need to fast for forty days afterward to
purify himself.12 A number of years ago, a prominent Muslim religious leader
had been surprised to learn that spirit possession was occurring on a regulär
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basis in a compound near his own. When hè asked some people in his entou-
rage why those in the neighboring compound seemed to drum so often, they
replied that it was spirit possession. They were surprised by his question, hav-
ing assumed all along that hè would have been aware of what was going on, if
only by the distinctive drum beats. The religious leader immediately sent some-
one to the compound to teil these neighbors that they should move elsewhere.
They did so, relocating to a part of town away from his compound.
While these examples point to the pervasiveness of spirit possession, they
also suggest that most Muslims acknowledge its existence in often close prox-
imity. At the same time, many make conscious attempts to avoid spirit posses-
sion. If this seems to suggest an attitude of relative toleration, this is not al-
ways the case. The following is an example of a direct threat of violence against
those involved in spirit possession. One man told me that when he was a
young student of the Qur'an hè and some of his peers learned that a woman
involved in spirit possession had acquired a house near the compound where
they were studying. He said that they were very unhappy to learn this and
sought out the woman to inform her that if she ever engaged in spirit posses-
sion in the place in question that they would proceed to stone the house. The
woman never moved into the house, and it was never used for spirit posses-
sion. Although the woman and her associâtes did not cease their activities,
they did keep away from potential critics like these young men, thereby avoid-
ing harassment and possibly even physical violence.13
If those involved in spirit possession have been able to act relatively freely
in some villages and towns in Mali, there continues to be considérable conflict
around spirit possession in many places. In some villages, certain inhabitants
have actively sought to drive out those involved in spirit possession. The women
who organized spirit possession in one village I know were compelled to leave.
A man with a régional réputation for the specifically non-Islamic esoteric knowl-
edge that hè employed in divination and healing for himself and a range of
clients told the women that what they did (organize a spirit society) was char-
latanism. He insisted that they stop their activities or go elsewhere. In this
case, the women seemed to have posed somewhat of a challenge to the man's
authority as a ritual specialist. After unspecified threats, the women aban-
doned this particular village, though not their activities in spirit possession.
In some towns in Mali, some civil servants have been known to try to halt
spirit possession activities for basically religious reasons. This has not always
been easy, given that those involved in spirit possession have been able to
secure a measure of protection from the Malian state, which asserts its secular
nature regularly.14 As an ostensibly secular entity, the Malian state is not per-
mitted to intervene in the affairs of a particular religion. With spirit possession
equated hère with religion and having nearly the same status as Islam and
Christianity, the state thus helps to guarantee the right to engage in religious
practices like spirit possession. Although unable to officially ban spirit posses-
sion, some civil servants have taken advantage of their official rôles to try to
obstruct it. This has particularly been the case with a number of self-styled
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pious Muslim civil servants, who, in some cases, hâve employée! administrative
means to regulate spirit possession in areas under their jurisdiction. In many
cases, such efforts hâve hampered, if not prevented, such activities. For example,
local authorities often require costly permits for making noise, as is almost inévi-
table in the requisite drumming in most spirit possession ceremonies.
There are also a variety of other local and régional practices that are dis-
tinct from spirit possession, but which Muslim religieus leaders find no less
objectionable. Some of thèse are also "ritual" in nature and involve "spirits."
For example, I attended thé annual communal "visit" by thé youth from a
cluster of interrelated villages in western Mali with a protective female spirit,
who is said to live in a cave adjacent to one of the villages. Although nearly
everyone in this village professed to be Muslim and noted that their ancestors
had been Muslims for at least a hundred years, people explained to me this
"visit" was not Islamic. Some people—perhaps cautious when confronted by
the inquisitive, visiting anthropologist—suggested that the "ritual" was all
child's play. Others hinted that it was almost akin to the "folklorization" of
the practices of non-Muslim ancestors (see Launay 1992). Still yet others told
me that it all might look like play drumming, dancing, and refreshments, but it
was actually quite serious. For these people, this annual ritual "visit" was an
obligation; the villagers had to pay homage to this spirit, who had protected
them in the past. To fail to do so might bring härm to them. In this case, many
people find such "traditions" and/or "customs" inappropriate.
Thus far, most of the practices discussed have been those of people who
consider themselves Muslims, even though many others find such practices at
least objectionable if not explicitly un-Islamic, and, therefore, best renounced.
At the same time, many other individuals and groups, who generally do not
identify themselves as Muslims (or Christians for that matter), engage in local
and régional "religious" practices or "traditions." Since such practices hâve
long been in contact with Islam and Muslims, I am reluctant to use the term
"indigenous. "15 In the past as well as in thé présent, it has not been uncommon
for non-Muslim West Africans to use some of the signs and objects of Islam
(Monteil 1924; Bravmann 1976,1983; Launay 1992; Royer 1996). Even the
above-mentioned ritual visit with thé female spirit, which its practitioners do
not see as an Islamic ritual, is actually tied to thé Islamic lunar calendar. There
are also many other practices explicitly anchored in allegedly non-Islamic knowl-
edge, as is thé case of bamanaya, with thé manipulation of power objects,
often through sacrifice. In contemporary Mali, many of thé practices of non-
Muslim healers and diviners, such as divination, blessings, and almsgiving, are
actually quite similar in form to those of Muslims (cf. Bazin 1986).1<! Bamanaya
is not, however, thé only un-Islamic knowledge that people talk about or em-
ploy. Among many groups of people m Mali, but especially among those for
whom Islamization is thought to be more récent, there is spécial knowledge,
usually charactenzed as secret m nature, thought to be not only outside thé
realm of Islam but un-Islamic. For example, in Fulf ulde, one of the most widely
spoken languages in Mali, particularly by thé Fulbe, there is the notion of
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anndal balewal, literally, black knowledge, which ritual specialists employ in
ways analogous to ritual specialists in bamanaya.
In short, there is a wide range of religious practices, knowledge, "customs,"
"traditions," and so forth in Mali that many people find questionable, if not
exactly un-Islamic, from explicitly and usually self-consciously Muslim per-
spectives. For this reason, we might say that thé terrain was in some ways
well-prepared for thé organized campaigns against such activities, which got
underway in thé 1980s.
PROSELYTIZATION: PAST AND PRESENT
If some practices like spirit possession hâve a long history in Mali, thé at-
tempts by certain Muslims to get others to abandon such practices hâve per-
haps an equally long history (Hunwick 1985). In thé nineteenth Century, there
are numerous examples of Muslims objecting to some of the practices dis-
cussed in thé above section. For example, a West African scholar from Timbuktu
visiting North Africa addressed a treatise to thé Muslim ruler in Tunis calling
for the banning of spirit possession (Hunwick 1997). As part of the fihad he
led in thé nineteenth Century throughout large parts of what is present-day
Mali, Umar Tau destroyed thé "idols" of some of his non-Muslim adversaries
(Robinson 1985; Monteil 1924). Similarly, in the late nineteenth Century, be-
fore his capture by thé French, Samory, another important Muslim leader in
this part of West Africa, also destroyed "idols" as a prelude to the construc-
tion of mosques:
In each village where Samory was sovereign, he ordered thé destruction
of protective statues. He began to construct a mosque, even if rudimen-
tary; he acted to support a priest [imam], even if not a very learned one,
in each mosque; he forced thé chiefs of his subjects to send their children
regularly to Quranic school (Gouilly 1952, 81).
It is significant that thèse images of West African Muslims destroying "pro-
tective statues" are actually quite similar in form to thé motif of the prophet
Muhammad's destruction of idols in Mecca at the beginning of his mission in
610. Indeed, this prophétie model is one upon which many Muslims through-
out history hâve drawn (see, e.g., Fischer and Abedi 1990). Undoubtedly, those
engaged in more récent proselytization in contemporary Mali hâve also looked
to this model and its more récent West African imitators. Although many schol-
ars hâve emphasized thé often crucial rôle that Muslim saints and Sufis hâve
played m thé propagation of Islam before thé twentieth Century in such places
as India, Indonesia, and sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., Levtzion 1979), thé activi-
ties of such religious figures m thé contemporary period hâve not received
adéquate attention. If proselytization by Muslims under French colonial rule
in West Africa was quite commonplace (though largely unstudied for reasons
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that remain unclear) the study of such proselytization and its effects provides
an important window on the anthropology and history of West African societ-
ies. I now turn to consider perhaps the most important of contemporary
proselytization efforts m postcolonial Mali.
Over extended periods in thé 1980s and thé 1990s, Sidy Modibo Kane
(1925-96), a prominent Malian Muslim religions leader, who was widely re-
puted to be a saint, undertook a séries of long trips throughout thé country-
side in Mali (Soares 1996a, 1997b). It is reported that during these trips he
converted thousands of non-Muslims and sometimes even whole villages to
Islam and also worked to eradicate spirit possession and other purportedly
un-Islamic practices. In all, hè is said to have led such campaigns in nearly five
hundred villages in Mali and many others in neighboring Côte d'Ivoire.17 Thèse
proselytization efforts have been extensively commented on in Mali, not least
because of their scope and range.
During his campaigns, Sidy Modibo, as the religieus leader is commonly
known, exhorted villagers to give up what he considered un-Islamic practices.
While he found nothing objectionable in a minority of thé villages he visited,
he found at least one thing to combat in most places. He preached basically
against three things he deemed either un-Islamic or incompatible with Islam.
Hère, I want to highlight Sidy Modibo's rhetoric, especially thé tripartite cat-
égories he used to name that which he sought to eradicate. First, he inveighed
against thé use of boli and basi, "idols," that is, thé plurality of non-Islamic
power objects commonly employed in bamanaya.19 Second, he condemned
what he referred to as thé moonaankoobe—which translates from Fulfulde
(his first language) as "those who feign illness"—a commonly used term for
those involved in spirit possession.19 Alternately, he referred to such people in
writing (in French and Arabie) as "people who practice the law of the jinn
[spirits]." Third, he urged people to give up those "customs" (hère using a
word derived from thé Arabie, 'adat) that he claimed were incompatible with
Islam and being Muslim. An example of such a custom is the social rule of
some Malians that prevents bride and groom from cohabitating until a num-
ber of years after their actual marriage. It is striking how marked the catégo-
ries used are. Most notably, "idols" for non-Islamic objects and "those who
feign illness" and "the law of the jinns" for spirit possession unambiguously
index thé antipathy of Sidy Modibo—and many other Malians—for such ob-
jects and practices.
Sidy Modibo concentrated a considérable amount of his efforts among thé
country's non-Muslim rural population, particularly in some of those areas
allegedly most résistant to Islamization in the past. In fact, he even went to
some of thé very places that were known for their firm and sustained opposi-
tion to the jihad led by Umar Tall in thé nineteenth Century. He spent time in
thé village, which thé region's non-Mushms long considered "a holy town,"
according to one French colonial administrator, not least because it was "the
principal boulevard of résistance in this land" against Islamization and thé en-
croachment of Umar Tall's Islamic state (de Lartigue 1898). Unlike in earlier
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efforts to spread Islam in thèse same géographie areas, inhabitants from some
of thé villages invited Sidy Modibo to visit them. In many cases, he received
thé wärmest of réceptions.
Everywhere Sidy Modibo went, he proclaimed to people that their fortune
would improve once they embraced Islam, if they were not Muslims, or once
they renounced un-Islamic practices, if they already professed to be Muslims.
In particular, he noted that those who had faced recurring drought would see
better times if they did. When among people who considered themselves non-
Muslims, Sidy Modibo and members of his large entourage actually implored
villagers to relinquish their non-Islamic power objects and emphasized thé
pitfalls of not doing so. Sidy Modibo instructed members of his retinue to
collect and count thé objects, and careful records were kept of the numbers
and provenance of the objects. In some cases, they destroyed thèse objects by
fire immediately after collection; in other cases, they delivered some of them in
sacks to thé offices of thé state-run média in Bamako, thé capital city, ostensi-
bly to publicize their meritorious activities.20 Sidy Modibo taught non-Mus-
lims thé shahada (thé Muslim profession of faith) and thé ritual daily prayers.
In many cases, a member of his entourage stayed behind to act as imam (prayer
leader) and to instruct thé villagers in prayer and Islam.
In those villages where thé people professed to be Muslims, that is, in nearly
half of thé five hundred villages he visited, Sidy Modibo was not concerned
with locating power objects. In his way of thinking, the existence of power
objects hère was not even a question—indeed it was inconceivable (cf. Soares
1997b). Instead, he was intent on discouraging thé practice of spirit posses-
sion. This is because many Malians note that spirit possession is generally only
présent in those places in Mali where thé people are Muslims.21 In thé many
villages Sidy Modibo visited where spirit societies existed, he gave sermons
against their practices. After doing so, he invited spirit mediums and their
followers, almost all of whom were women, to renounce their practices bef ore
him. As part of thé process of renunciation, Sidy Modibo placed his hands on
thé heads of spirit mediums. This he did to expel the spirits. Those women
who agreed to this procédure usually emitted violent screams or deep moans—
sounds that indexed the departure of the spirits inhabiting their bodies.22 In
many cases, such women required several days of rest to recover from what
was an exhausting and trying expérience of what might be called exorcism.
Even though thèse Muslim proselytization efforts in thé 1980s and 1990s
seem to be quite novel in Mali, particularly in their scale and scope, their
techniques and stratégies are not without precedent in this région. Al-Bakri's
eleventh-century description of a West African ruler's conversion is in striking
ways quite similar—in form and even in some of the details—to the contem-
porary campaigns. As he wrote, the ruler of Malel, presumably a Mande king-
dom, had become Muslim after meeting a Muslim visitor to his kmgdom:
The king complained to this man about his people's sufferings [from
prolonged drought]. He replied, "O king, if you only believed in God
238 * Benjamin F. Soares
almighty, acknowledged His unity and the mission of Muhammad, and
believed in all the articles of faith, then I would pray on your behalf for
relief from what you are suffering and for what has befallen you. Thus
you could bring universal benefit upon the people of your country and
thereby incite all your enemies and adversaries to envy." He persisted
with him until hè agreed to embrace Islam, and that in sincerity. .. .
[Eventually, after the Muslim's prayers,] God envelopped [sic] the land
with abundant rain. In conséquence of this the king ordered the destruc-
tion of the idols and the expulsion of the magicians from his country
(quoted in Trimingham 1962, 61-62).
Although some of the conditions facilitating the contemporary Muslim
proselytization include Sidy Modibo's widespread réputation (Soares 1997b),
hè operated within a climate where many Malian Muslims are troubled by
certain social and religieus practices that they encounter, hear about, and of-
ten avoid. While many Malians praised the activities of Sidy Modibo on be-
half of Islam, there was some opposition—overt and not so overt—to his
proselytization efforts. In some cases, non-Muslims in certain villages refused
to allow Sidy Modibo to visit. In other villages, after the departure of the
religieus leader, some presumed converts to Islam simply refashioned the ob-
jects they had surrendered and which had been destroyed by Sidy Modibo and
members of his entourage. Moreover, some women involved in spirit posses-
sion were purposely absent from their villages during Sidy Modibo's visits.23
One must ask what the conséquences of such proselytization have been. It
is certainly the case that many Muslims in Mali continue to rely upon spirit
possession, particularly, though not exclusively, for healing purposes. Despite
the social pressure not to engage in spirit possession and the opprobrium sur-
rounding it, and even such widespread and extensive campaigns against it,
even some of those who do not dispute that spirit possession is unequivocally
un-Islamic might, in some instances, be willing to engage with it. They do this,
unremarkably, in often clandestine ways. This is particularly the case during
personal crises such as serious illness. Thus, it is not uncommon for people
who have been unable to find any effective treatment for serious illness—
whether through the esoteric sciences of a Muslim religieus figure, non-Mus-
lim healers, or Western biomedicine—to seek out the therapeutic services of a
spirit society and/or its medium. In some cases, a medium might organize spirit
possession ceremonies for the purposes of treatment of a person who would
ordinarily be very wary of spirit possession. I have observed self-consciously
pious Muslims actually attending and participating in semi-public spirit pos-
session ceremonies. In one case, this was because all other means of therapy
had been tried to no avail. In another, a man purchased medicines from a spint
medium by indirect means; hè relied on intermediaries so his dealings with the
medium would not become public knowledge.
Very similar things can be said about sources of non-Islamic knowledge, as in
bamanaya with its power objects, which Sidy Modibo also sought to eradicate.
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Hère too his efforts might have a limited effect because many Muslims in Mali
continue to use and to rely upon the medicines and thérapies of non-Muslim
healers. They do so because many of these thérapies are found to be effica-
cious, more affordable, readily available, and/or seemingly less risky than
Western biomedicine. When asked about the use of such non-Muslim théra-
pies, most Muslims are quick to note that the use of such "traditional" medi-
cine is really no different from the use of other medicines also made by non-
Muslims, particularly Western biomedicine. As long as such medicines are not
tainted by illicit ingrédients and practices, their use is permitted. In a sense,
such things are only licit for these Muslims because they have been de-
sacralized—at least from their perspective. But many Muslims also readily
admit that it is difficult to détermine with much précision whether such medi-
cines are in fact licit, that is, made without contravening the precepts of Is-
lamic law.24
As for those who are actively involved in spirit possession, and are not
simply appealing to it in times of crisis, many are unwilling to forego their
interaction with the spirits despite the social pressures they face. They do not
necessarily see a contradiction between spirit possession and being Muslim.25
But they are fully aware that many other Muslims do see them as irreconcil-
able. For this reason, many do try to hide their involvement in spirit posses-
sion from disapproving friends, neighbors, and relatives, and often go to great
lengths to do so. Similarly, disapproving relatives might keep their social dis-
tance from kin involved in spirit possession. For example, I know a particu-
larly renowned spirit medium who told me that since she was a child she has
had a close relationship with the spirits, as other women in her family have
had. As a young woman, she married a Muslim cleric, and, over the years, he
grew unhappy about her involvement in spirit possession. He finally told her
that she would hâve to décide between the spirits or marriage to him. She
decided to choose thé former, and they were divorced. Since that time, she has
worked as a médium and healer, establishing a régional réputation and acquir-
ing considérable capital. Needless to say, her continued involvement in spirit
possession is thé source of considérable embarrassment to some of her rela-
tives, particularly those who are Muslim clerics.
Ail of this points to thé fact that many of those who participate in spirit
possession are embattled, whether in thé daily interactions with fellow Malians
or thé rather extraordinary encounters with a celebrated Muslim religious leader
like Sidy Modibo committed to stamping out spirit possession. It is perhaps
the case that those involved in spirit possession are even more embattled than
"traditional" healers given the professionalization of African medicine, which
the Malian state has promoted. With few exceptions, spirit possession adepts
are unable to counter the rather pointed criticism they receive from the many
Muslims, who charge them with un-Islamic behavior. When Sidy Modibo went
to see one of Mali's most renowned spint mediums, hè asked her directly
about her allegedly un-Islamic practices. In response, she categorically denied
doing anything illicit in nature. As évidence of her own piety as well as probity,
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this particular spirit medium indicated to her potential critics—including Sidy
Modibo—that she conducts her spirit possession sessions in Arabic, that is,
the language of the Qur'an. As further proof, teachers of the Qur'an not only
live in but also teach in her own compound, where she organizes her activi-
ties—perhaps a good example of what some have called "debating Muslims"
(see Fischer and Abedi 1990). On the whole, most spirit mediums and their
followers, however, are unwilling or unable to stand up so directly to critics
like Sidy Modibo. One spirit medium I know told me that her activities in
spirit possession were not in any way un-Islamic. She explained that one man,
who was a descendant of the prophet Muhammad, had consulted her for heal-
ing and had been effectively cured.26 Needless to say, such "évidence" is un-
likely to convince many Malians of the merits of spirit possession and, more
specifically, her activities, which many condemn outright, even without direct
knowledge of them.
One of the ironies is that the postcolonial Malian secular state, which often
associâtes itself with Islam (Soares n.d.) and might even have encouraged "con-
version" to Islam (Soares 1996a), in other instances helps to guarantee the
right to engage in religious practices that are abhorrent to the majority, includ-
ing spirit possession, in overwhelmingly Muslim towns and villages. Although
spirit possession has remained populär, those involved in spirit possession keep
a fairly low profile. In some cases, they have even been forced to modify their
practices. For instance, while those involved in spirit possession might in some
cases have a tradition of not convening during the month of Ramadan, in
other cases it seems that this "tradition" might be a strategy to avoid too much
attention from potential critics, including those part of or close to the civil
service. When funds are not available for costly permits required for drum-
ming in urban areas, those involved in spirit possession might meet and try to
summon the spirits in publicly less obtrusive ways. For example, they can
convene without noisy drumming—though many complain that such tech-
niques are much less efficacious. In spite of the opprobrium and considérable
pressure they face from such "modernizing"—not to mention secularizing—
actors, many people continue to embrace "traditional" religious practices, spirit
possession, and so forth. If some practice their allegedly un-Islamic religious
traditions openly and defiantly, many others do so much more discreetly. In
the end, such "traditional" religious practices may indeed be transformée!, as
they are increasingly relegated to private or at least semi-public venues, that is,
out of the view of some of their critics.
Although Sidy Modibo's proselytization efforts might not be the direct
cause of such developments, hè undoubtedly profited from a genera! climate
of hostility to spirit possession and other such "un-Islamic" religious prac-
tices and traditions. At the same time, his proselytization has also been im-
portant in focusing attention on what so many Malian Muslims find objec-
tionable, but paradoxically not so objectionable that they will not have recourse
to them if de-sacralized, and, if not de-sacralized, at least in time of crisis or
covertly.
* :
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NOTES
1 Islamization under French colonial rule in West Africa is still not properly un-
derstood. Por a French colonial perspective, see Cardaire 1954. Por recent studies,
see Harmon 1988; Launay 1992; and Launay and Soares 1999.1 have discussed the
anthropological debates about "conversion" elsewhere. See Soares 1995.
2 Wahhabis and the Wahhabiyya are the terms used to describe the community
formed in Arabia by Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1787), whose doctrines
were adopted and propagated by the House of Sa'ud of present-day Saudi Arabia.
During the French colonial period, administrators applied the terms Wahhabi and
the Wahhabiyya to "reformist" Muslims and anti-Sufis in West Africa, and this ter-
minology continues to be used. Anti-Sufis, so-called Wahhabis, in Mali have received
considérable scholarly attention. See, for example, Kaba 1974; Hamès 1980; Amselle
1985; Triaud 1986; Niezen 1990; Brenner 1993; and Soares 1997a. On Saudi activi-
ties in Africa, see Schulze 1993.
31 have developed this thème elsewhere. See Soares 1997a, n.d.; cf. Brenner 1993;
Launay and Soares 1999.
4 I am unable to address here the issue of anti-Sufis accusing Sufis of un-Islamic
behavior. See the références in note 2 above.
5 The form of spirit possession that emerged under French colonial rule among
the Songhay of West Africa captured in Jean Rouch's film, Les maîtres fous, is possi-
bly the most familiär to Western scholars. On the history of spirit possession among
the Songhay, cf. Olivier de Sardan 1984; Stoller 1995. See also Makris 1996 for a
discussion of the history of spirit possession in the Sudan.
6 Such documentation of spirit possession was almost without exception a pre-
lude to the denunciation of such practices as un-Islamic. For an example from the
fifteenth Century, see Hunwick 1970.
7 See Centre des Archives d'Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence, France, 75 APOM 5/6,
Robert Arnaud, "Du commandement chez les Diawaras. Histoire d'une tribu guerrière
du Soudan," 30 June 1918, "Note sur une pratique Fétichiste en usage chez les
Diawara." The rest of this paragraph is based on this source.
8 Most of what follows concerns this form of spirit possession.
9 On the subject of healers in Mali, see Brunet-Jailly 1993 and Diakité 1993.
10 See the discussion of "sacrifice" in chapter 29 of al-Qayrawani, a text from the
Maliki school of Islamic jurisprudence, that is widely used in West Africa.
11 For a discussion of similar practices in the Sudan, see Boddy 1989 and Makris
1996.
12 It is interesting to compare this with the rules for "expiation" in al-Qayrawani
(1975,167-69).
13 For a discussion of the harassment of some of those involved in spirit posses-
sion in neighboring Niger, see Stoller 1989; Vidal 1990; and Masquelier 1993a, 1993b.
14 This is interesting to compare with rule under thé Mahdists (1885-98) in thé
Sudan, when a form of spirit possession was suppressed. See Makris 1996,167.
15 For a général critique of ethnological views of "paganism" and a discussion of
some of the connections between Islam and other religious traditions m this part of
West Africa, see Amselle 1990. For a very interesting study along thèse lines based on
récent ethnography in Mali, see Zobel 1996. See also Matory 1994.
16 This is without mentioning reported, though unconfirmed, coopération and
collaboration between such non-Muslims and Muslim religious leaders, for example,
in healing or in "cleansing" a town of malevolent spirits.
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17 This information cornes from a list of villages visited by the Muslim religious
leader in the present author's possession.
18 Sometimes the religious leader's entourage used the French word (fétiches) and,
other times, words in Bamanakan such a bolt and basi, "power objects." On such
terminology, see Hackett 1996. For a discussion of some of these issues for contem-
porary Benin, see Elwert 1995.
19 See moonaade in DNAFLA 1993. Needless to say, spirit possession adepts do
not embrace such language.
20 Members of the entourage informed me that the state-run media in turn sent
the objects to the National Museum in Bamako. This may have been in response to a
1985 Malian law protecting the "national cultural héritage" (patrimoine culturel
national). See Jonckers 1993, 87 n.4.
21 In other words, they do not consider all forms of "possession" in Mali to be
spirit possession.
22 As I hâve noted elsewhere (Soares 1997b), I learned such details from Sidy
Modibo's entourage.
23 It is important to note that there are no known cases in which those involved in
spirit possession successfully blocked a visit by thé religious leader.
24 It is not clear, however, what rôle the increased professionalization of indig-
enous medicine bas already had in this realm. On thé professionalization of African
medicine, see Last and Chavunduka 1986.
25 Récent discussions of "religious diversification" (Aguilar 1995), plural prac-
tices in a Muslim society (Lambek 1993), "syncretism" (Stewart and Shaw 1993),
and reconsiderations of "conversion" (Royer 1996) are all relevant here.
26 If this is another example of "debating Muslims," the power differentials in-
volved in such debates are more manifest here.
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